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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the main characteristics of the (re)emerging foreign aid policies of the 
Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), concentrating on the 
allocation of their aid resources. We adopt a simple econometric approach, similar to the 
ones used in the literature for analyzing the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors. Using 
this approach, we examine the various factors that influence aid allocation of the Visegrád 
countries, using data for the years 2001-2006. Our most important conclusion is that aid 
allocation decisions by the four emerging donors are not influenced by the level of poverty or 
the previous performance (measured by the level of economic growth or the quality of 
institutions) of the recipients. The main determining factor seems to be geographic proximity, 
as countries in the Western-Balkans and the Post-Soviet region receive much more aid from 
the Visegrád countries than other recipients. Historical ties (pre-1989 development relations) 
are also found to be significant explanatory factors. This allocation is in line with the foreign 
policy and business interests of these new donors, but it can also be a consequence of the fact 
that their foreign aid policies are still in their infancy. 
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Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past decade a number of Central and Eastern European countries have emerged as new 
donors of foreign aid. Although these countries already had certain forms of development-
related cooperation with Third World countries during the Cold War, the pre-1989 
experiences are difficult to compare with their current, (re)emerging aid policies. There is a 
clear pressure, related mostly from OECD and EU membership, for these new donors to align 
themselves with the norms and principles of the international development aid regime. Many 
special characteristics are observable however in the Central and Eastern European donors 
which predict that they will behave differently than the OECD DAC member countries. In 
part this may be related to the fact that their foreign aid policies are still in their infancy, but it 
is also undeniable that their motivations for giving aid are also somewhat different than those 
of the Western donors. It is logical to assume that the consequences of these different 
motivations are identifiable in the quality and allocation of aid provided by the emerging 
donors.  
 
In this paper we examine the determining factors behind the aid allocation of the Central and 
Eastern European donors, using a simple regression method. Our goal is to show that these 
donors take different factors into consideration when making decisions on how to allocate 
their aid resources than the most OECD DAC countries do. More specifically, the hypothesis 
of our research is that the Central and Eastern European donors do not take into account the 
recipients’ need for aid (measured by their per capita income levels), nor their previous 
performance (measured by their growth performance or institutional quality). There is a 
growing body of literature that argues that these factors are increasingly important in 
explaining the aid allocation of the OECD DAC countries. We argue however, that due to the 
emergent character of their aid policies and their different motivations for giving aid, Central 
and Eastern European countries will take other factors into consideration when making their 
aid allocation decisions.  
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We do not wish to analyze the quality of aid provided by the Central and Eastern European 
donors, as the lack of data would seriously hinder any such attempts. We reduce the scope of 
the countries we examine to the four Visegrád countries, namely the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as they have the most advanced and significant foreign aid 
policies in the region. According to our knowledge, the aid allocation of these countries has so 
far not been scrutinized extensively in the literature.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews the literature on the aid allocation of the 
OECD DAC donors, with a special focus on the methodology of the various studies and their 
results. Section 2 lists the main common characteristics of the aid policies of the four 
Visegrád countries. Section 3 introduces a few stylized facts concerning the aid allocation of 
these emerging donors, and section 4 contains the description and estimation of our regression 
model. Section 5 concludes the paper. Throughout the paper, the terms aid, foreign aid, and 
development assistance are used as synonyms, and they always refer to the OECD’s statistical 
category of ODA (official development assistance).  
 
1. Aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors  
 
There are no single and unambiguous conclusions in the literature examining the determinants 
of aid allocation. One of the main reasons for this is that each donor country may have several 
motivations for giving aid and it can be difficult to pinpoint any single driving force. But even 
if we could identify the main determining factors in case of a single donor country, the 
diversity among donors would still make any generalization exceedingly difficult. A second 
reason for the mixed of results in the literature is related to the question of what time period 
the various authors analyze. It is quite clear that the aid allocation decisions of the donors 
were influenced by different factors during the Cold War than the ones that are relevant today.  
 
The main models for explaining aid allocation in the literature are the recipient need and the 
donor interest models (McKinley and Little 1979; Gounder 1994; McGillicray 2003). 
According to the former, aid allocation should be driven by the needs of the recipients, 
therefore countries with lower incomes, higher levels of poverty, or lower levels of human 
development should receive more aid. The donor interest model on the other hand states that 
foreign aid serves donor interests, and thus those countries will receive more resources which 
have some kind of political, economic or other relations with the given donors. Although this 
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distinction is to some extent flawed, as donors may have interests in giving aid to poor 
countries to reduce poverty, it has become a frequent point of reference in the literature.  
 
The majority of authors analyzing the period of the Cold War clearly subscribe to the donor 
interest model. They conclude that aid allocation decisions were primarily driven by strategic 
and geopolitical considerations, and so donors usually gave more aid to countries that were 
important to them due to some strategic reason. Aid was used as a tool of influence in this 
context. Alesina and Dollar (2000) for example showed that during the Cold War the donors 
gave more aid to those recipients with which they had longer colonial ties or which belonged 
to the same alliance system as they did. The case of the United States is well known, which 
used aid to achieve geopolitical goals ever since the birth of foreign aid (Morgenthau 1963), 
as it gave more resources to those countries which were especially important in the 
containment of regional Soviet influence. Israel and Egypt, especially after the 1979 Camp 
David agreement, also received huge amounts of US assistance. McKinley and Little (1979: 
243) came to the conclusion that there is “no grounds for asserting that humanitarian criteria 
have any significant direct influence” on aid US allocation. 
 
However, during the Cold War, economic and trade considerations also meant an important 
motivation for donors. In an influential early study, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) argued that 
among other motivations, donors give more aid to countries with which they have higher 
volumes of trade. There is a relative consensus however in the literature that during the Cold 
War the previous performance of the recipients, the quality of their political leadership, the 
level of poverty (Maizels and Nissanke 1984), the respect of human rights (Neumayer 2003) 
or the level of corruption (Alesina and Weder 2002) were not decisive factors in determining 
the amount of aid they received from the donors. 
 
Although the literature examining the Post-Cold War era also has mixed conclusions, there 
seems to be some degree of consensus concerning the fact that changes have occurred in 
donor behavior. Dollar and Levine (2004) for example came to the conclusion that since the 
second half of the nineties an increasing number of donors are taking the previous 
performance (measured by the quality of institutions and policies using the World Banks 
CPIA index) and levels of income of the recipients into consideration when deciding on how 
to allocate their aid. Their findings are supported by the conclusions of Isopi and Mavrotas 
(2006). Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006), also examining the post-1989 period found that aid 
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and per capita income have been negatively related, while aid has been positively related to 
infant mortality, human rights, and government effectiveness. 
 
The reason behind this perceived shift from donor interests to recipient needs may be related 
to increased ethical considerations of the donors, but probably security-related aspects are the 
most important. Perhaps it does not even mean a shift towards recipient needs, rather a shift 
within donor interests.1 Poverty and security challenges posed by state weakness became 
especially apparent for donors after the turn of the Millennium (and the 9/11 terrorist attacks). 
Foreign aid can serve as a tool for battling such global threats (Brainad et al 2003; Rotberg 
2002). This however would require effective and well allocated resources. As shown by 
Collier and Dollar (2002), there is a close link between the allocation of aid and its overall 
effectiveness. According to their results, the number of people pulled out of poverty can be 
maximized if those countries receive the most aid where per capita incomes are low, but 
policies and institutions are of good quality. McGillivray et al (2005) in a review on the 
empirical literature argued that aid effectiveness has been increasing since the 1990’s, which 
may in part be due to a more effective allocation of aid. 
 
Most of the works mentioned above seek to make generalizations on the level the entire 
foreign aid regime. Other authors however concentrate only on a single donor, or a group of 
donors, and try to establish the factors that effect their aid allocation. This approach allows for 
more clear-cut conclusions, as it does not seek to generalize results for the heterogeneous 
group of all aid donor countries (Gounder 1984; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; 
Berthélemy 2006). According to these studies, the well-known, although simplistic cleavage 
between “altruistic” and “egoistic” donors is clearly identifiable. While many donors (such as 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands of the United Kingdom) do take 
into consideration the needs of the recipients when determining the allocation of their aid; 
others, such as the United States or Japan seem more interested in furthering their own shorter 
term interests, and try to reap the economic benefits from foreign aid. Still, it is possible to 
identify some shift even in US foreign aid policy as well, such as the creation of the 
Millennium Challenge Account in 2004 (Radelet 2003). 
 
                                                 
1 Danielson and Wohlgemuth (2005) argue that donors such as Sweden are not driven by altruism, but rather a 
kind of “enlightened egoism”. This refers to the fact that such countries have recognized that instead of short 
term economic and foreign policy benefits, it is in their long term national security interest to decrease global 
poverty.  
 6
Most of the works cited above use regression methods to identify the main factors which 
influence the allocation of foreign aid. The dependent variable in such regressions is the 
amount of aid a recipient receives (either from one donor, or all donors). The independent 
variables represent such factors which may influence this amount, but of course taking all 
such factors into account is not easy. In fact, quantifying some the determinants of aid 
allocation into variables in a regression model raises many questions. The main works in the 
literature usually use the following independent variables (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; 
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Younas 2008): 
 variables indicating recipient need, such as GDP per capita, levels of poverty or 
some measure of human development;  
 variables indicating the previous performance of the recipient, which try to capture 
how much aid the recipient “deserves”, and how effectively it can use these 
resources. This can be measured by levels of economic growth, the quality of 
economic and political institutions, the quality of economic policies or the level of 
corruption;  
 variables indicating donor interests, measuring the intensity of relations between 
the recipient and the donor(s), such as those indicating former colonial ties, the 
volume of bilateral trade, the stock of bilateral investments, the participation in a 
common military alliance, etc.; 
 other variables, such as the size of the population in the recipient country. 
 
The models in the literature are usually estimated using panel data in order to increase the 
number of observations in the regression, following the methods suggested by Trumbull and 
Wall (1994). It must be noted however that the results of such regression-based studies must 
always be treated with a degree of skepticism. Due to the inherent uncertainties of the method, 
conclusions based on regression analysis should only be accepted if they are also supported 
by research using other methodologies, such as case studies. Still, there appears to be much 
less methodological debate in the literature on the regression analysis of aid allocation then 
there is, for example, on the regression analysis of the effects of aid on economic growth2 We 
feel that regression analysis is an appropriate methodology for analyzing the aid allocation 
decisions of the Central and Eastern European countries, as it can help in identifying common 
patterns which may be different than those observable in case of the OECD DAC donors. So 
                                                 
2 See for example Rodríguez (2007) or Roodman (2007).  
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far, according to our knowledge, only descriptive case studies have been published to analyze 
the foreign aid policies of these countries. Before we introduce our simple regression 
approach, we feel it is important to draw up the main characteristics of the foreign aid policies 
of the Visegrád countries, as well as the factors that determine these.  
 
2. The main characteristics of the Visegrád donors 
 
After the turn of the Millennium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all 
started to create, or recreate their international development policies. All four countries 
possessed some degree of former international development experience, since before 1989 
they all had development relations with Third World countries in one form or another. During 
the Cold War the countries of the Eastern Block did not have sovereign foreign policies, and 
thus their international development efforts were also subordinated to the political, military 
and other interests of the Soviet Union. This influence could be pinpointed in the allocation of 
their aid: the recipients were mostly developing countries with socialist or strongly leftist 
governments, not to mention the formal allies of the Soviet Block (Carbone 2004: 244). It is 
difficult to compare these pre-1989 foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries to the 
classic project- and program oriented approach of the OECD DAC member states, as they 
mainly consisted of the delivery of in kind goods, technical cooperation, scholarships and tied 
aid credits (Szentes s.a.; Baginski 2002).3 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the initiation of the transition process, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland all suspended their foreign aid policies, which was an understandable 
decision given the severe recession that the economic transformation process caused. With the 
European Community’s PHARE program these countries became recipients of foreign aid. 
Throughout the nineties, foreign aid was basically restricted to giving a limited amount of 
scholarships to developing country students, as well as membership fees and other ad hoc 
contributions to international organizations (such as the WHO, the ILO or the UNDP). In the 
case of Hungary, an important form of aid was the resources granted to ethnic Hungarians 
                                                 
3 A detailed scientific analysis of these pre-1989 development policies is missing from the literature. We must 
not however underestimate the importance of these policies. Hungary for example in the 1970’s spent an average 
0,7 percent of its national income on various forms of foreign aid, which is an extremely high level, even though 
the methodologies for calculating both national incomes and aid levels in the Eastern Block at the time do not 
permit comparisons with Western donors and current aid levels (HUN-IDA 2004). The opinion of Michaux 
(2002: 19) therefore, who states that the Central and Eastern European countries do not have any development 
traditions is clearly wrong.  
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living in the Ukraine, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. But all together the nineties were 
characterized by the steep decline of foreign aid polices. 
 
By the end of the decade an increasing international pressure appeared on the four countries to 
take their share in aiding poorer countries. At first, this pressure stemmed from membership 
in the OECD,4 and later the EU was also prominent in pushing these countries to create new 
foreign aid policies. Still, the issue of international development cooperation was 
spectacularly neglected during the accession negotiations, which signified the low political 
priority that both sides attached to it (Balázs 2003; Lightfoot 2008; Harmer and Cotterrell 
2005: 11). Besides international pressure, other factors might have also contributed to the 
creation of these policies after the Millennium. Drozd (2007: 6) for example remarks that in 
the case of Poland an important factor was to demonstrate that the country’s transition to a 
full-fledged market economy has been completed. All four countries laid down the legal, 
institutional and financial foundations of their new international development policies 
between 2001 and 2003, the process of which was helped by a joint capacity building project 
carried out by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). It is clear therefore that the international 
development policies of the Western countries served as role-models for the emerging foreign 
aid policies of the four Visegrád countries.  
 
Taken this historical background into consideration, it is difficult to compare the current 
emerging foreign aid policies of the four countries with those of the OECD DAC donors, who 
have many decades of experience. These differing characteristics lead to different goals and 
motivations for the Visegrád countries than the ones observable in case of the Western 
donors. The main characteristics are the following:  
 The Visegrád countries are small states and neither of them was a colonial power, 
which leads to the conclusion that their former political relations with developing 
countries were sporadic at best. As they did not have sovereign foreign policies before 
the transition, they did not have the possibility to form relationships with developing 
countries according to their own national interests (Baginski 2002; Carbone 2004).  
                                                 
4 The Czech Republic became a member of the OECD in 1995, followed by Hungary and Poland in 1996, and 
Slovakia in 2000. This however did not mean automatic membership in the OECD DAC, where the four 
countries have only observer status to this day. 
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 As a partial consequence of the above, the Visegrád countries only have limited 
economic ties today with developing countries as well.  
 The four countries are much less affected by the security threats caused by global 
poverty and state weakness, at least on the level of perceptions. They count more as 
transit countries in case of international migration and drug-trafficking, and the threat 
of terrorism is not significant. The dangers of global pandemics however, cannot be 
neglected by these countries either. 
 The questions of international development are usually not part of the public discourse 
agendas in the four countries, and so public awareness about these issues is also much 
lower than in the Western donors. This is well reflected by the various Eurobarometer 
surveys, which also show at the same time that the citizens of the Visegrád countries 
are not indifferent towards the situation in the developing countries from a moral 
standpoint (see for example Eurobarometer 2007). 
 The four countries are facing severe development challenges of their own and so it 
may be difficult for governments to justify spending large amounts on foreign aid 
towards the taxpayers. Wishes to join the euro-zone and the straightjacket of the 
Maastricht-criteria also limit any possibilities these countries may have for a quick 
increase in funds spent on foreign aid.  
 
It is clear that the few characteristics listed above will definitely have an effect on the 
quantity, quality and allocation of the foreign aid disbursed by the four Central and Eastern 
European countries. We only make a few remarks concerning quantity and quality, as our 
research is mainly confined to examining the allocation of their resources.  
 
The amount of aid disbursed by the Visegrád countries is quite low compared to the OECD 
DAC average, both compared to the GNI’s of the respective donors and especially in absolute 
terms. Table 1 shows the evolution in the past years of the ODA/GNI figures of the four 
countries and compares it to the DAC average. Although an increasing trend is visible to 
some extent, 2007 showed stagnation, and in case of Hungary a rather spectacular decline. 
With the exception of Hungary, where the decline of the ODA/GNI also meant the decline of 
the absolute amount spent on foreign aid, stagnating ratios hide increasing absolute amounts 
(OECD 2007a: 33; 2008: 33). 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions concerning the quality of aid channeled by the 
four countries. Even though some descriptive and even normative studies have been published 
in the past years (see for example Kiss 2007, Drozd 2007 or OECD 2007b), a lack of 
comparable data renders any such attempt almost impossible. These few existing studies do 
permit a fair amount of critical remarks concerning aid quality, but it must be kept in mind 
that we are dealing with emerging foreign aid policies, still in the phase of learning. Still, the 
most important generalizable conclusions from these studies are the following:  
 The institutional settings for aid delivery in the four countries are highly fragmented. 
Too many organizations and ministries are involved, there is a lack of strategic focus, 
the proliferation of partners and sectors and thus resources is clearly present (OECD 
2007b: 14; World Bank 2007: 3; Kiss 2007: 8-9; 11; Zagranica Group 2007: 15). 
 Their foreign aid policies are highly donor-driven, the recipients have little influence 
on planning and programming resources. Recipient ownership is basically non-
existent (OECD 2007b: 20; Zagranica 2007: 19). 
 The evaluation of projects is not given ample emphasis, feedback and organizational 
learning are neglected (OECD 2007b: 21).  
 
It is clear that more research is required in order to gain broader insights into the qualitative 
aspects of foreign aid channeled by the Visegrád countries. From our perspective however, 
the quality of aid is secondary, the main question is who they give it to. Taking the historical 
background and other characteristics of the four countries described in this section into 
account, it is also possible to gain better insights into their aid allocation decisions.  
 
3. A few stylized facts on the aid allocation of the Visegrád Countries  
 
Perhaps one of the most striking features of the aid allocation of the Visegrád countries is that 
they seem to concentrate most of their resources on partners in their neighborhood, mainly the 
Western Balkans and the Post-Soviet region. Although the stability of these two regions is 
important for all European countries, it is a paramount interest for Central and Eastern 
Europe, as they would be the ones most hardly hit by potential instability in the forms of 
increased migration, decreasing international trade and foreign investments and increasing 
levels of organized crime. Avoiding further conflict in the former Yugoslavia and promoting 
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political stability and economic growth in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is 
one of the most important foreign policy interest of the Visegrád countries. Some numbers 
relating to their aid allocation data shows it well how important these two regions are for the 
four emerging donors. In 2005, the Czech Republic channeled the largest share, 26 percent of 
its bilateral aid to European countries, and a further 15 percent to countries in Central Asia 
(Adamcová et al 2006: 76). Serbia and the Ukraine were among the top three recipients. In 
2005 Poland disbursed 61 percent of its total bilateral aid to European countries, the top three 
recipients being Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (Development Co-operation Poland 2007). 
Hungary channeled 43 percent in 2005 to European countries, with Serbia and the Ukraine 
also being among the top three partners (Kiss 2007: 13).  
 
Some further conclusions on the partner countries may be drawn from Table 2, which lists all 
those countries with which the Visegrád donors have had more important bilateral aid 
relationships between 2001 and 2007, or which were defined as partner countries in some 
official document or policy statement.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Browsing Table 2, it becomes clear that the partner countries of the four emerging donors 
may be divided into the following three groups (with some exceptions):  
 countries belonging to the immediate neighborhood, or in other words to the Western 
Balkans or the CIS region; these countries are dominant in Table 2.; 
 the inclusion of Iraq and Afghanistan is a result of international obligations and the 
close ties to the United States;5 
 the final group is composed of partner countries “inherited” from the Communist 
period. These are the countries with whom development partnerships have already 
existed before the transition, such as Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Laos. Formerly (or in some cases even today) these countries 
all had socialist-oriented political systems, or for some other reason they hoped to gain 
(development or military) assistance from the Soviet Block.  
 
                                                 
5 Hungary and the Czech Republic even manage two provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. 
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The question of arises why do the Visegrád countries choose far-flung developing recipients, 
why don’t they concentrate all their aid resources to their neighboring countries (and perhaps 
on any international obligations)? Their security-related motivations for giving aid clearly 
dictate giving aid to potentially unstable countries in their proximity. Being present in far 
away developing countries also entails costs that may be prohibitively high for such emerging 
donors. Also, they have much more limited economic and political ties with these countries. 
The reason for supporting such countries, in our opinion, is international pressure, since both 
the EU and the OECD expect (although perhaps they do not explicitly state it) that the 
emerging Central and Eastern European donors support less developed countries as well 
(Michaux 2002; Drozd 2007: 10). If they have to select such partner countries, it seems a 
logical decision for them to select ones with which they have previously (before the 
transition) had relations and thus may have some experience.  
 
4. Regression approach, data and results 
 
The few facts mentioned above and the grouping of partner countries shown in Table 2 still 
do not prove that the four emerging donors systematically behave in a fundamentally different 
fashion than the OECD DAC donors do. In order to pinpoint the factors that influence the aid 
allocation decisions of the Visegrád countries we employ a simply regression approach, in 
some aspects similar to the ones used for analyzing the aid allocation decisions of the DAC 
members in the literature (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; 
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levine 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Younas 2008). The 
models used of course must be adapted to the characteristics of the Visegrád countries and 
limits posed by the availability of data. For one thing, we cannot use panel data methods, as 
we do not have long enough time series data for the aid allocation of the four donors. 
Therefore, in our approach we create an average of all the necessary variables for the years 
between 2001 and 2006, and thus obtain a single cross-sectional dataset. The basic model we 
estimate is summarized in equation (1). 
 
log(V4ODAcapj) = β0 + β1log(popj) + β2log(GDPcapj) + β3GDPgrj + β4Intj + 
β5Balkanj + β6CISj + β7Socj 
where 
- V4ODAcapj: annual average per capita ODA received by recipient j from 
(1) 
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the Visegrád donors, using data from the OECD DAC; 
- popj: the average size of recipients j’s population, using data from the 
IMF;  
- GDPcapj: average per capita GDP of recipient j in purchasing power 
parity, data from the IMF;  
- GDPgrj: average annual rate of GDP growth in recipient j, data from the 
IMF;  
- Intj: average institutional quality in recipient j, using data from Freedom 
House and Political Risk Services; 
- Balkanj: dummy variable, indicating whether recipient j is a country in 
the Balkans or not; 
- CISj: dummy variable, indicating whether recipient j is a member country 
of the CIS or not (the value of the dummy is also 1 in case of Georgia); 
- Socj: dummy variable, indicating whether recipient j was a recipient of 
aid from either of the Visegrád countries before 1989.  
 
We attempted to take all potential factors into consideration in our model which may have an 
impact on how the aid resources of the four emerging donors are allocated among recipients. 
Our model includes variables measuring the need of recipients for aid (GDP per capita), the 
previous performance of the recipients (growth rate and the quality of institutions), as well as 
variables relating to the political and security-related interests we have observed concerning 
the aid allocation of the Visegrád countries (dummy variables signifying the geographical 
position of the recipients). The dummy variable relating to the pre-1989 partner countries tries 
to catch the effects of path dependency (Szent-Iványi and Tétényi 2008).6 It is regretful that 
there is no appropriate variable for measuring economic relations between the Visegrád 
donors and their aid receiving partners. In the literature on the OECD DAC donors, usually 
the volume of bilateral trade, or the stock of foreign direct investment is used. These data 
however are not readily available in case of our four donors. We hope however that this will 
not weaken the explanatory power of our model, since the economic interests of the Visegrád 
donors would mainly predict larger aid flows to the Balkans and the CIS regions, thus these 
interests may be captured sufficiently by the two dummy variables relating to these two 
regions.  
                                                 
6 See the appendix for data sources. 
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As mentioned, we use a cross sectional dataset, gained from averaging the annual values of 
the data for the years between 2001 and 2006 for all countries that have received aid from one 
or more of the Visegrád donors, according to the StratExtracts Online database of the OECD 
DAC. Each recipient thus constitutes a single observation. The main reason for using such 
averaged data is to control for the effects of large annual fluctuations in the aid flows (which 
are relatively common). The dependent variable is created by adding the amount of aid a 
recipient receives from the four donors, divided by the population of the recipient. The 
dependent variable is added in relative (per capita) terms, following Maizels and Nissanke 
(1984) and Chauvet (2002). Correlation coefficients between the variables in our model are 
not large, and thus we do not fear that multicollinearity will bias the estimates of the 
regression parameters.  
 
Between 2001 and 2006 altogether 106 countries7 haves received smaller or larger amounts of 
ODA from one or more of the Visegrád donors.8 Most of these countries have only gotten 
very small amounts, and there are only 21 countries which have received more than 1 million 
dollars per year. Table 3 contains the list of these countries.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Table 4 contains the results of the estimation of our basic model, as well as some simple 
sensitivity tests. In model (1) we use the data from Freedom House to measure institutional 
quality in recipients (variable int_fh). Freedom House publishes two index numbers in their 
annual report “Freedom in the World”, one measuring political rights, the other measuring 
civil liberties. Both are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the 
lowest level of freedom. In our model, we have taken the two indicators and averaged them 
across countries to get a single indicator measuring the quality of political institutions. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
                                                 
7 We are however only able to work with 105 countries because Iraq falls out due to lack of data.  
8 This does not mean that the four donors have actually financed development projects in all these countries, as 
expenses such as refugee costs, scholarships and debt forgiveness also qualify as ODA.  
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The conclusions from model (1) in Table 4 are quite straightforward: the four Visegrád 
countries do not take into account the level of poverty or the performance of their recipients 
when determining their aid allocation, as neither GDP per capita, neither the level of GDP 
growth, nor the quality of institutions are significant. It seems that these emerging donors 
make their aid allocation decisions based exclusively on the population level of the recipient, 
geographic proximity and former (pre-1989) relations. The explanatory power of model (1) is 
reasonably high for such regressions (the size of the coefficient of determination is 0,57). The 
results of estimating the first model therefore support the hypothesis of our paper.  
 
In model (2) of Table 4 we used a different indicator to measure institutional quality. Instead 
of the measure used by Freedom House, we use one of the indicators published by Political 
Risk Services’ (PRS) in its International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We have chosen the 
“law and order” index from the publication, which measures the degree of independence of 
the judicial system of the country, but also how much the people and the government respect 
the laws (including the probability of expropriation). These factors are one of the main 
determinants of how secure property rights are in an economy and whether is it worth doing 
long term investments. Thus, the “law and order” index is a reasonably good measure of the 
economic institutions which affect long term growth and the effectiveness of aid (Szent-
Iványi 2007). “Law and order” is measured on scale of 1 to 6, where lower scores mean a 
lower level of the observance of law and the independence of the court system. 
 
Interestingly, in model (2) the “law and order” index turned out to be significant at the 5 
percent level and the coefficient is positive. This would imply that countries with higher 
levels of law and order receive more aid from the Visegrád countries. However, some caution 
is in order with this result: as Political Risk Services provides data on a smaller number of 
countries than Freedom House does, we had to drop 24 observations from this second model 
because the index was not available for them. Many of the countries dropped from the 
regression are ones that have low quality legal institutions and systems, but receive high 
amounts of aid from the four emerging donors, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
FYR Macedonia, Georgia or Uzbekistan. It may be probable that dropping these countries 
distorts the results, but on the other hand we cannot rule out the possibility that the Visegrád 
donors may actually take the quality of institutions into account, as measured by the index 
from the ICRG. 
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In model (3) we dropped both institutional variables from the regression, and included too 
dummy variables. One represents Afghanistan, a significant outlier not accounted for in the 
other dummy variables, and the other one represents the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
perhaps the region most in need of foreign resources. The dummy on Afghanistan is of course 
significant, and adding it to the model increases the explanatory power. The dummy on Sub-
Saharan Africa is not significant.  
 
Models (4) and (5) only include the significant variables; the former with the index from 
PRS’s ICRG, the latter contains no variable on institutional quality. There are no surprises in 
these two models, perhaps the only change is that in model (4) the PRS index is now only 
significant at the 10 percent level. Our results therefore seem to be robust: when determining 
the allocation of their aid, the Visegrád donors do not take into consideration the income 
levels of the recipients, their economic performance, nor their political institutions (measured 
by the respect of political and civil liberties). Besides the size of the population, the only 
significant explanatory factors are related to geographic proximity, pre-1989 relations and in 
case of Afghanistan (and potentially Iraq) the existence of international commitments. It also 
seems that a different measure of institutional quality (“law and order”) may also be 
significant, although the fact that we lose many observations when including this variable in 
our regression greatly decreases the robustness of this final result. According to model (5) in 
Table 4, countries in the Western Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, 
Macedonia) ceteris paribus receive more than four and a half times (360 percent) more aid 
from the Visegrád donors than any other of their partners. The CIS countries (and Georgia), as 
well as the pre-1989 partners also receive more aid, in both their case the amounts are 
approximately 260 percent higher.  
 
All models examined have a determination coefficient between 0.57 and 0.61, which can be 
regarded as reasonably high in case of such regressions. Of course, it is not possible to obtain 
too high explanatory power, as the foreign aid allocation of a donor country is always affected 
by unforeseen events (such as natural catastrophes which require urgent humanitarian 
assistance) or ad hoc political considerations, which would be more difficult to model. We are 
also aware of the fact that our regression analysis would require further tests and perhaps 
methods more sophisticated than OLS in order to be truly robust. However, as our 
conclusions are in line with the stylized facts and the limited case study evidence, we feel it 
identifies well the factors that influence aid allocation in the four emerging donors.  
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Conclusions 
 
In our paper we analyzed the foreign aid policies of the four emerging Visegrád donors with a 
special emphasis on the factors that determine the allocation of their aid resources. The 
conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis clearly support the main hypothesis of our 
paper. The level of poverty (measured by per capita GDP) and the previous performance of 
the recipients (measured by the rate of economic growth or the quality of institutions) are not 
significant factors in explaining the aid allocation of the four donor countries.  
 
According to our results, the Visegrád donors seem to behave in a similar fashion to the 
donors that the literature has labeled ‘egoistic’, at least when it comes to their aid allocation. 
The four countries mainly support recipients in relation to which they have political, security 
and economic interests, as countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS region are the most 
important recipients. The reduction of global poverty is clearly not a consideration. While this 
observed aid allocation is in line with the interests of the four donor countries, the question 
arises how much it is due to strategic decisions. It is plausible for example, that the Visegrád 
only choose recipients from their ‘neighborhood’ fore reasons of convenience. Providing 
large scale foreign aid to extremely poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or other far away 
developing regions would be much more costly, and the experience of the four emerging 
donors in those areas is also much less. A further explanation may be that the four donors 
have some kind of perceived or actual comparative advantage compared to other donors in the 
Western Balkan and CIS regions. Therefore, more than one explanation may be possible for 
the observed ‘egoistic’ aid allocation, but determining which one is relevant is beyond the 
scope of this current paper. 
 
A further question may arise in close connection with the above: in the long run, due to 
processes of ‘Europeanization’ and other forces, can we expect convergence between the 
practice of the Western-European donors and the Visegrád donors? Will the latter shift their 
focus in time to poor developing countries or will they prefer to concentrate their resources to 
countries in their proximity in the longer run as well? The European Union has an important 
role to play in such a potential convergence process, as it can create an ‘anchor’ for the aid 
policies of the Central and Eastern European countries through its explicit and implicit 
requirements. A direction of further research (and a potentially important contribution to the 
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literature on Europeanization) would be the analysis of the main characteristics of this 
process.  
 
Last, but not least, we must address one more issue. Throughout the paper, we implied that 
the four Visegrád donors behave the same way in their foreign aid policies. This implicit 
assumption, even though it was a necessary simplification for our research, is however 
probably not correct. Even though the four countries have similar historical and institutional 
backgrounds, similar foreign policy and security interests and goals, there are also many 
distinct factors influencing the aid policies and aid allocation of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. Analyzing these characteristics and their consequences however 
requires longer time series, as well as better qualitative data.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. ODA/GNI ratios in the Visegrád countries between 2002 and 2007, in percent 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Czech Republic 0,07 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,11 
Hungary .. 0,03 0,06 0,11 0,13 0,08 
Poland .. 0,01 0,05 0,07 0,09 0,09 
Slovakia 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,10 0,09 
OECD DAC 
average 
0,23 0,25 0,26 0,33 0,31 0,28 
 
Source: OECD 2007a: 33; 2008: 33. 
 
 
Table 2. Declared priority and other important partner countries of the Visegrád countries in 
2007. 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan  
Angola Bosnia and Herzegovina Angola Albania  
Bosnia and Herzegovina Cambodia  Belarus Belarus  
Iraq China  Georgia Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Moldova Ethiopia  Iraq FYR Macedonia  
Mongolia FYR Macedonia  Moldova Kazakhstan  
Serbia  Iraq  Palestine Authority Kenya 
Vietnam Kyrgyzstan Serbia Kyrgyzstan 
Yemen Laos  Ukraine Mongolia 
Zambia Moldova Uzbekistan Mozambique 
 Mongolia Vietnam Serbia  
 Palestine Authority  Sudan 
 Serbia   Tajikistan 
 Ukraine  Ukraine 
 Vietnam  Uzbekistan 
 Yemen   
Sources: Adamcova et al (2006); Kiss (2007); Development Co-operation Poland (2007); SlovakAid (2006) 
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Table 3. Recipients receiving more one million dollars of ODA per year from the four 
Visegrád donors between 2001 and 2006 
 
Partner country 
Average V4 ODA  
(million dollars) 
Partner country 
Average V4 ODA  
(million dollars) 
Iraq 27,29 Mongolia 2,94 
Serbia & Montenegro 17,24 Kazakhstan 2,68 
Angola 15,79 Ethiopia 2,33 
Ukraine 14,52 Uzbekistan 2,25 
Yemen 7,97 Moldavia 2,19 
Belarus 7,07 Tanzania 1,70 
Afghanistan 6,65 India 1,57 
Sudan 5,98 Georgia 1,38 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 5,47 Pakistan 1,00 
China 4,07 Albania 1,00 
Vietnam 3,45   
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD StatExtracts Online  
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Table 4. Cross sectional OLS estimates for the aid allocation of the Visegrád donors, between 
2001 and 2006  
 
Dependent variable: log(V4ODAcap) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log(gdp_cap) 
0.008 
(0.061) 
-0.15 
(-1.094) 
0.087 
(-0.47) 
- - 
log(pop) 
-0.445* 
(-6.704) 
-0.443* 
(-4.783) 
-0.439* 
(-5.5) 
-0.453* 
(-5.14) 
-0.448* 
(-7.316 
gdp_gr 
0.017 
(0.404) 
-0.009 
(-0.162) 
-0.009 
(-0.24) 
- - 
int_fh 
-0.012 
(-0.13) 
- - - - 
int_prs - 
0.271** 
(2.005) 
- 
0.224*** 
(1.795) 
- 
Balkan 
3.625* 
(6.01) 
3.548* 
(3.625) 
3.645* 
(5.822) 
3.397* 
(3.577) 
3.691* 
(6.256) 
CIS 
2.52* 
(5.14) 
2.97* 
(5.068) 
2.683* 
(5.67) 
2.882* 
(4.768) 
2.638* 
(5.795) 
Soc 
2.575* 
(4.073) 
2.851* 
(-3.72) 
2.742* 
(4.473) 
2.939* 
(4.088) 
2.665* 
(4.49) 
Africa - - 
0.043 
(0.093) 
- - 
Afghanistan - - 
4.104* 
(7.896) 
- 
3.89* 
(28.103) 
constant 
-3.815* 
(-3.492) 
-3.275* 
(-3.246) 
-4.456* 
(-2.611) 
-4.345* 
(-9.814) 
-3.765* 
(-19.166) 
R2 0.57 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.61 
Adj. R2  0.54 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.59 
Number of 
observations (n) 
105 81 105 81 105 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (using White’s method).  
* = Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix: Data sources  
 
Variable Data source 
Per capita GDP (GDPcap)  
IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
Online 
Population data (pop) 
IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
Online 
GDP growth rate (GDPgr) 
IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
Online 
ODA data (V4ODAcap) OECD StatExtracts Online 
Freedom House index (int_fh) 
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 
Online 
‘Law and order’ index (int_prs) 
Political Risk Services: International 
Country Risk Guide 2008 
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